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I. INTRODUCTION 
A child’s access to justice is predicated on the assumption that 
the subject of the proceeding, the child, will have legal 
representation to petition the court and have a voice in the 
proceeding.  Two notable United States Supreme Court cases are 
emblematic of children’s access to justice, marked as they are by 
the Court’s pronouncement that “[t]he right to representation by 
counsel is not a formality.  It is not a grudging gesture to a 
ritualistic requirement.  It is the essence of justice.”1 
The 1967 landmark case, In re Gault,2 established that children 
have a constitutional right to counsel in delinquency proceedings.  
Gault followed Kent v. United States3 where the United States 
Supreme Court held that children may not be transferred from 
juvenile court to criminal court without a hearing in which they are 
 
 †  Executive Director, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota, Member, ABA 
Section of Litigation Children’s Law Committee Working Group, William Mitchell 
College of Law, J.D. magna cum laude, Simmons College School of Social Work, M. 
Sc. in Social Work, Wellesley College, B. A.  Ms. Bohr was Editor and Executive 
Editor of William Mitchell Law Review.  She clerked for retired Minnesota Supreme 
Court Justice A. M. “Sandy” Keith and was an associate at Faegre & Benson.  She 
served on the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task Force 
and on the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile Protection Rules Committee.  In 
addition to representing children in court, she serves on the Children’s Justice 
Initiative Committees in both Hennepin and Ramsey counties and the Ramsey 
County Combined Jurisdiction Advisory Committee. 
 1. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966). 
 2. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 3. 383 U.S. 541 (1966). 
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represented by counsel.4  While Gault involved the delinquent act 
of making a “lewd or indecent”5 telephone call, it led to an 
examination of procedural due process rights in other proceedings 
involving children, especially in dependency (child protection) 
proceedings.6  The court in Gault noted: 
The right of the state, as parens patriae, to deny to the child 
procedural rights available to his elders was elaborated by 
the assertion that a child, unlike an adult, has a right ‘not 
to liberty but to custody’. . . . On this basis, proceedings 
involving juveniles were described as ‘civil’ not ‘criminal’ 
and therefore not subject to the requirements which 
restrict the state when it seeks to deprive a person of his 
liberty.7 
Nevertheless, because delinquency proceedings could result in 
the loss of liberty for the juvenile, the Court held that children 
have a right to counsel in all proceedings in which an adverse 
finding may result in incarceration.8 
As “the essence of justice,” the right to representation is not 
limited to delinquent behavior; indeed, even in dependency or 
child protection proceedings, the state may place the child with 
strangers, away from home, family and relatives, often against his or 
her will—resulting in a loss of liberty.  While Kent and Gault dealt 
with delinquent behavior characterized as “neither criminal nor 
civil,” they provide the underpinnings for the representation of 
counsel for children in dependency proceedings.9 
Indeed, the Gault Court’s reliance on the Report by the 
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) is instructive.  
The Report stated: 
The Commission believes that no single action holds 
more potential for achieving procedural justice for the 
child in the juvenile court than provision of counsel.  The 
presence of an independent legal representative of the 
child, or of his parent, is the keystone of the whole 
 
 4. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36. 
 5. Id. at 4. 
 6. See Susan A. Snyder, Promises Kept, Promises Broken: An Analysis of Children’s 
Right to Counsel in Dependency Proceedings in Pennsylvania, 1 JUVENILE LAW CENTER 
(2001). 
 7. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17. 
 8. Id. at 41. 
 9. See Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: Appointing Counsel for 
Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1579 (1996). 
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structure of guarantees that a minimum system of 
procedural justice requires. 
Fears have been expressed that lawyers would make 
juvenile court proceedings adversary.  No doubt this is 
partly true, but it is partly desirable.  Informality is often 
abused . . . . And in all cases children need advocates to 
speak for them and guard their interests, particularly 
when disposition decisions are made.  It is the disposition 
stage at which the opportunity arises to offer 
individualized treatment plans and in which the danger 
inheres that the court’s coercive power will be applied 
without adequate knowledge of the circumstances. 
The Commission recommends: Counsel should be 
appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action 
is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by 
child or parent.10 
At the time of the report, Minnesota was one of a few states 
that already gave the “minor, parent, guardian or custodian the 
right to counsel.”11  As a result, when the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar 
Association approved the Uniform Juvenile Court Act in 1968, 
Minnesota was not among the states that adopted the Uniform 
Juvenile Court Act.12 
 
 10. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 38-40 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON 
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY 86-87 (1967). 
 11. In 1959, Minnesota adopted the Juvenile Court Act, which on the subject 
of appointment of counsel stated, “The minor, parent, guardian or custodian have 
the right to counsel.  If they desire counsel but are unable to employ it, the court 
shall appoint counsel to represent the minor or his parents or guardian in any 
other case in which it feels that such appointment is desirable.”  1959 Minn. Laws, 
ch. 685, subd. 2, 1288.  The Act made no distinction between delinquency and 
child protection proceedings.  Indeed, delinquency and child protection 
proceedings were combined in the juvenile code until 1999 when the juvenile 
delinquency provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were codified in chapter 260B 
and the child protection provisions of the Juvenile Court Act were codified in 
chapter 260C.  The Gault Court cited Minnesota as one of “a few states” that 
required advising the child of the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed.  
Gault, 387 U.S. at 37 n.63 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.155(2) (Supp. 1966) 
(replaced by MINN. STAT. §§ 260B.163, 260C.163 (2000)). 
 12. Minnesota had a connection to the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws: the late William Mitchell College of Law 
Professor Maynard Pirsig was Chair of the Commission in 1968. 
3
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II. OUTLINE OF ARTICLE 
Despite the foresight of the 1959 Minnesota Legislature in 
giving children the right to counsel in juvenile court, the reality of 
children’s access to justice in 2001 falls short of this promising start.  
This article will discuss systemic and substantive issues that have 
implications for children’s access to justice in Minnesota.  The 
child’s right to counsel in delinquency proceedings is not within 
the scope of this article. 
Systemically, there are funding and policy issues related to 
providing lawyers for children.  In juvenile protection proceedings 
where the state/county is the petitioner, even where there is 
agreement that children have the right to counsel, there is not 
enough funding to pay lawyers to represent children.  In custody 
proceedings in Family Court, where the litigants are private parties, 
on the other hand, there is disagreement about whether children 
should have a voice in the proceedings.  Indeed there is no 
statutory right to counsel. 
Substantively, a recent change in the Minnesota Juvenile 
Protection Rules has affected a child’s access to justice.  The 
amended rule provides that the child who is the subject of a 
juvenile protection matter is a participant, not a party,13 resulting in 
lesser procedural rights for the child. 
Finally, this article will discuss the Standards for Legal 
Representation of Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases promulgated by 
the American Bar Association.  Providing “high quality legal 
representation” to children is the goal of these standards; achieving 
that goal will go far to improve access to justice for children. 
III. JUVENILE PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS 
Juvenile protection proceedings are civil proceedings where 
the state/county is the petitioner and the parent is the respondent.  
The child, as the subject of the proceeding, has an interest in the 
outcome of the proceeding and has a right to legal counsel.  The 
Kent and Gault decisions are reminders that when there is state 
action and the power of the state can be brought to bear on 
decisions affecting the child in profound ways such as where and 
with whom the child will live, counsel for the child is imperative.14 
 
 13. MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 58.01 (2000). 
 14. Gault, 387 U.S. at 1; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 541 (1966). 
4
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Since the 1959 Juvenile Court Act, not only has Minnesota 
continued to give children the right to counsel, it has been explicit 
about what kind of counsel: “The child, parent, guardian or 
custodian has the right to effective assistance of counsel in connection 
with a proceeding in juvenile court.”15  In addition, the statute is 
prescriptive: “Counsel for the child shall not also act as the child’s 
guardian ad litem.”16 
Yet, in a move that circumscribed children’s access to justice, 
the statute was amended in 2000 to limit appointment of counsel to 
children ten years of age or older.  “[I]f the child desires counsel 
but is unable to employ it, the court shall appoint counsel to 
represent the child who is ten years of age or older . . . in any case 
in which it feels such an appointment is appropriate.”17 
The amendment is indicative of the systemic impediments to 
providing representation to children.  Until 2000, when children in 
child protection proceedings had the right to counsel without 
regard to age,18 the state did not provide sufficient funding to 
ensure vindication of that right.  Consequently, many children did 
not get lawyers.  If they did, in some counties they often did not 
have continuity of representation because they had a different 
lawyer for each hearing thereby compromising the quality of the 
representation. 
In 1998, there were 18,854 children in out of home 
 
 15. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 3(a) (2000) (emphasis added).  The 
effective assistance of counsel standard comports with the “quality representation” 
and “high quality representation” described in the STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR 
LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES (American Bar 
Assoc. 1996) (adopted by the ABA House of Delegates on February 5, 1996) and 
the “competent representation” referred to in NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND 
FAMILY COURT JUDGES, RESOURCE GUIDELINES: IMPROVING COURT PRACTICE IN CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT CASES 22 (1995). 
 16. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd. 3(c).  While Minnesota has been clear that 
the lawyer for the child cannot also be the guardian ad litem, in other states, such 
as Pennsylvania, guardians ad litem must be an attorney at law and represent both 
the legal and best interests of the child.  See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6311(a); see 
generally ABA Standards, supra note 15, ABA Standard A-1 (stating “[t]he term 
‘child’s attorney’ means a lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who 
owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent 
representation to the child as is due an adult client.”). 
 17. MINN. STAT. § 260C.163 subd. 3(b). 
 18. There is agreement that all children in child protection proceedings have 
legal rights that need protection.  For a full discussion on the appointment of 
counsel for every child see Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care and Adoption Task 
Force Final Report, 102-06 (1997) [hereinafter Adoption Task Force]. 
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placements in Minnesota.19 Other than a few non-profit 
organizations,20 representation for children in child protection 
proceedings is provided by the public defender system, a system 
primarily geared towards criminal proceedings.  In a six county 
survey conducted by the Minnesota Supreme Court Foster Care 
and Adoption Task Force in 1997, the major metropolitan 
counties, Hennepin and Ramsey, showed very low rates of attorney 
representation for children; 5% for Hennepin County and 6% for 
Ramsey County.21  Otter Tail and Anoka Counties had the highest 
rate of attorney representation for children. 
Besides the unavailability of counsel for children, the child’s 
right to effective assistance of counsel can be compromised when 
juvenile court and family court matters are combined.  For 
example, when custody proceedings are between two divorcing 
parents—private parties—the child, one of the subjects of the 
proceeding, does not generally have standing to be heard in court 
and there is no statutory right to counsel.22  Indeed, one might 
argue that the same rationale for providing lawyers in juvenile 
protection matters does not pertain in family court matters because 
the state is not involved in the potential removal of the child from 
the family or the custodial parent. 
In some instances, however, juvenile protection matters are 
combined with family court matters, and counsel is appointed for 
the child because of the child protection issues.  Despite the 
appointment, some judges decide not to hear what the child’s 
express wishes are with regard to where the child wants to live.  
When the judge makes a decision a priori not to hear from the child 
or even consider the child’s wishes, it is difficult not to conclude 
 
 19. CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, MINNESOTA KIDS: A CLOSER LOOK, 2001 DATA 
BOOK 31 (2001). 
 20. The Youth Law Project of Legal Aid of Minneapolis, Children’s Law 
Center of Minnesota, and Centro Legal are among the few Minnesota non-profit 
organizations that represent children in CHIPS and TPR proceedings. 
 21. See Adoption Task Force, supra note 18 and accompanying text.  Since the 
survey conducted in 1997, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s representation of 
over 350 children in CHIPS and TPR proceedings in Ramsey County changes this 
6% figure.  Id.  On the other hand, Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s 
representation of state wards in Hennepin County will not change the 5% figure 
because state wards were not entitled to representation before 1997.  Id. 
 22. Under permissive intervention, the child has sometimes been allowed to 
intervene to be heard in court.  Property distribution and child custody are among 
the subjects in divorce proceedings in family court. 
6
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that the child’s access to justice is diminished.23 
IV. PARTY VERSUS PARTICIPANT STATUS OF THE CHILD 
Whether or not the child is a party in juvenile protection 
proceedings affects the child’s access to justice.  On March 1, 2000, 
the newly amended Minnesota Juvenile Protection Rules came into 
effect.24  Until then, the Rules had not been amended since their 
enactment in December 1982.  While a body of case law has not yet 
developed regarding the amended Juvenile Protection Rules, there 
is one rule that has due process and access to justice implications 
for children who are the subject of a child in need of protection or 
services (“CHIPS”) proceeding or a termination of parental rights 
(“TPR”) petition.  This rule provides that the child who is the 
subject of a juvenile protection matter is a participant, not a party, in 
the juvenile protection matter.25 
The distinction between participant and party status has 
created a new issue for lawyers appointed to represent children in 
juvenile protection proceedings.  While it may not be obvious, 
there are significant differences between the two designations.  A 
child who is a party has all the rights usually associated with those 
involved in litigation, including: the right to receive notice, have 
legal representation, be present at all hearings, conduct discovery, 
bring motions before the court, participate in settlement 
agreements, and otherwise participate in the action.26  In contrast, 
the rights of a participant are limited to receiving notice, attending 
hearings, and offering information at the discretion of the court.27 
The Advisory Committee Comment to the Participant Status 
Rule, Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure 58.01, notes that 
“[t]he former rules did not distinguish between parties and 
 
 23. While having a lawyer does not guarantee that the child will get his or her 
wish with regard to where he or she will live, having a lawyer should mean that the 
judge will at least listen to the child’s concerns even if the judge subsequently does 
not grant the request.  To do otherwise conjures up Dean Pound’s vision of 
juvenile court in 1937, “The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in 
comparison with those of our juvenile courts.”  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18(1967). 
 24. The author was a member of the Minnesota Supreme Court Juvenile 
Protection Rules Committee that assisted in drafting the amended Juvenile 
Protection Rules. 
 25. MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 58.01. 
 26. Id. at 57.02. 
 27. Id. at 58.02, subd. 1. 
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participants.”28  The new distinction was justified on the basis that 
“[t]here may be many individuals concerned about the best 
interests of a child who do not have the immediate connection to 
the child that justifies treating them as parties.  The intent of this 
rule is to assure that such individuals are aware of the proceedings 
and are available to provide information useful to the court in 
making decisions concerning that child.”29  If “immediate 
connection” to the child is the justification for treating the 
individual as a party, then surely the child, the subject of the 
petition, has the most immediate connection and, who better than 
the child has “information useful to the court in making decisions” 
concerning the child?  Thus, the rationale for the rule undermines 
the distinction the new rule creates. 
The new rule is also inconsistent with relevant statutes.  For 
example, under Minnesota Statute section 260C.163, subdivision 2, 
“[a] child who is the subject of a petition, and the parents, 
guardian, or legal custodian of the child have the right to 
participate in all proceedings on a petition.”30  Further, “[t]he 
minor and the minor’s parent, guardian, or custodian are entitled 
to be heard, to present evidence material to the case, and to cross-
examine witnesses appearing at the hearing.”31  The right to 
participate encompasses the right to be heard, to present evidence 
and to cross-examine witnesses—all rights of a party under the 
Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure.  However, unless the child 
is granted party status under the new Rules of Juvenile Procedure, 
the child will be denied the rights these statutes provide to the 
child. 
The new Rules and the statute also differ with regard to 
inspection of reports and records.  For example, the statute is 
explicit: “[a]n attorney representing a child . . . shall be given 
access to records, local social services agency files, and reports 
which form the basis of any recommendation made to the court.”32  
However, the Rules limit the child’s right to inspect records in 
some cases if the child is not a party to the proceeding.  Minnesota 
Rules of Juvenile Procedure 67.03 provides that “[p]rior to the 
emergency protective care hearing, the parties shall be permitted to 
 
 28. Id. at 58.01 cmt. 
 29. Id. 
 30. MINN STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 2. 
 31. Id. § 260C.163, subd. 8. 
 32. Id. § 260C.171, subd. 3. 
8
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inspect reports or other written information or records that any 
party intends to present at the hearing.”33 
Finally, Minnesota Statutes allow a child to testify outside the 
courtroom setting “when it is in the child’s best interest to do so.”34  
However, because the statute does not refer to participants, a child 
who is the subject of a petition and, thus, a participant cannot 
move the court to receive his or her testimony outside of the 
courtroom unless the child is also a party.  Thus, if the child is not a 
party, the child may not be able to use the very law enacted for his 
or her benefit. 
Thus, if the child is not a party, the child’s lawyer cannot fulfill 
her responsibilities and duties to carry out the representation 
under the ABA Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children 
in Abuse and Neglect Cases.35  As defined by the ABA, the term 
“child’s attorney” means a lawyer who provides legal services for a 
child and who owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, 
confidentiality, and competent representation to the child as is due 
an adult client.36 
The basic obligations of the child’s attorney include obtaining 
copies of all pleadings and relevant notices, participating in 
depositions, negotiations, discovery, pretrial conferences, and 
hearings and developing a theory and strategy of the case to 
implement at hearings.37  The Commentary to ABA Standard B-1 
states: “[T]he child’s attorney should be prepared to participate 
fully in any proceedings and not merely defer to the other 
parties.”38  These standards assume that the child, the subject of the 
proceeding, is a party. 
To ensure that the client is afforded all of the rights available 
under Minnesota law and to ensure that counsel complies with his 
or her obligations, counsel appointed to represent the child should 
file a motion for intervention in the case.  The child who is the 
subject of the juvenile protection matter shall have the right to 
intervene as a party.39  Setting out the procedure for intervention of 
right, the Rules provide that the person with the right to intervene 
shall file with the court and serve upon all parties and the county 
 
 33. MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 67.03 (emphasis added). 
 34. MINN.  STAT. § 260C.163, subd. 6. 
 35. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15. 
 36. Id. at Standard A-1. 
 37. Id. at Standard B-1. 
 38. Id. at Standard B-1 cmt. 
 39. MINN. R. JUV. PRO. 59.01, subd. 1. 
9
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attorney a notice of intervention, which shall include the basis for a 
claim to intervene.40  The court administrator shall have the notice 
of intervention as a matter of right form available.  The 
intervention shall be deemed accomplished upon service of the 
notice of intervention, unless a party or the county attorney files 
and serves written objection within ten days of the date of service.  
If a written objection is timely filed and served, the court shall 
schedule a hearing for the next available date.41 
Even after the court appoints counsel for the child, attorneys 
for children in juvenile protection matters may find themselves 
having to file and argue motions to make the child, the subject of 
the juvenile proceedings, a party because some courts do not deem 
the intervention of right form to be sufficient.  And, even after the 
child is a party, some courts have tried to limit the child’s input in 
settlement negotiations.  Arguing whether the child should or 
should not be a party detracts from the main issues before the 
juvenile court, such as termination of parental rights, sibling visits, 
where and with whom the child will live, and access to services. 
Recognizing the anomalous distinction between the party and 
participant status of children, courts in one district have resolved 
the problem by making all children, age ten and older, parties.  
Noting that it made no particular sense to have the subject of the 
petition be deemed a participant rather than a party, Chisago, 
Isanti, Pine and Kanabec counties in the Tenth Judicial District all 
have adopted a standing order for all CHIPS cases that all children 
age 10 and older are deemed to be parties.  This approach 
alleviates the problem for lawyers in these counties.42  However, the 
issue remains in other jurisdictions. 
It is fair to say that in no other matter where lawyers are 
required to provide effective assistance of counsel is there a 
distinction between party and participant status of the client.  
Given the procedural rights that flow from party status, such as 
access to process, the child’s due process rights are compromised 
when the child is deemed a participant.  Gault is again instructive 
on this issue: “Departures from established principles of due 
 
 40. Id. at 59.03, subd. 1 
 41. Id.  While there is a presumption that intervention should be granted, 
Children’s Law Center of Minnesota’s lawyers for children have had to file briefs 
and argue the motion. 
 42. Children’s Law Center of Minnesota was successful in persuading the 
court in another county to deem the child a party in the same order appointing 
Children’s Law Center of Minnesota to represent the child. 
10
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2001], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss1/12
07_FINAL.BOHR 08.27.01.DOC 9/7/2001  11:42 AM 
2001] CHILDREN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE 239 
process have frequently resulted not in enlightened procedure, but 
in arbitrariness.”43 
In sum, although not intended at the time the rule was 
changed, the new rule making the child a participant and not a 
party presents a significant barrier to the child’s access to justice. 
V. EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Meaningful access to justice in juvenile protection proceedings 
is realized through quality representation provided by competent 
and diligent lawyers.  The Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who 
Represent Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases, promulgated by the 
American Bar Association in 1996, grew out of concerns of child 
advocates that even when children were represented, the 
representation they received was often times inadequate.44 
The Standards were adopted for two main reasons: to give 
guidance to aid lawyers representing children in abuse and neglect 
cases and to help implement ABA resolutions on “the importance 
of legal representation and the improvement of lawyer practice in 
child protection cases.”45  In essence, they provide a comprehensive 
guide to lawyers appointed to represent children. 
The Standards contain two parts: first “the specific roles and 
responsibilities of a lawyer appointed to represent a child in an 
abuse and neglect case;” and second “a set of standards for judicial 
administrators and trial judges to assure high quality legal 
representation.”46 
The Standards make clear that the “child’s attorney” means “a 
lawyer who provides legal services for a child and who owes the 
same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent 
representation to the child as is due an adult client.”47  Similarly, 
the Standards explicitly recognize that the child is a separate 
 
 43. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1967). 
 44. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL 
AGENDA FOR LEGAL ACTION 6 (1993).  On the subject of representation, it stated: 
“Children’s cases are often ‘processed’ not advocated, and too frequently 
children’s interests are poorly represented. . . . Meaningful protection of 
children’s rights requires that children be represented by highly skilled counsel at 
critical stages of critical proceedings.  Competent professional representation in 
proceedings that involve children is vital in a system where decisions about 
children’s rights and liberties and those of their parents are decided.”  Id. at 7. 
 45. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 15, at Preface. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at Standard A-1. 
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individual with potentially discrete and independent views.  To 
ensure that the child’s independent voice is heard, the child’s 
attorney must advocate the child’s articulated position.”48  Thus, 
the child’s lawyer “owes traditional duties to the child as client” 
consistent with the rules of professional conduct.49 
Communication with the child must be “developmentally 
appropriate” which means that “the child’s attorney should ensure 
the child’s ability to provide client-based directions by structuring 
all communications to account for the individual child’s age, level 
of education, cultural context, and degree of language 
acquisition.”50 
The Standards recognize that the foundation for representing 
children is “establishing and maintaining a relationship with the 
child.”51  Therefore, meeting with the child is important before 
court hearings and case reviews as well as when there are “changes 
in placement, school suspensions, in-patient hospitalizations, and 
other similar changes.  Such in-person meetings allow the lawyer to 
explain to the child what is happening, what alternatives might be 
available, and what will happen next.”52  The child’s lawyer must 
conduct “thorough, continuing, and independent investigations 
and discovery which may include, reviewing the child’s social 
services, psychiatric, psychological, drug and alcohol, medical, law 
enforcement, school, and other records relevant to the case.”53 
The child’s lawyer has the basic obligation to not merely be a 
fact finder, but rather to zealously advocate a position on behalf of 
the child.  It is therefore critical that the child’s lawyer be 
adequately prepared prior to hearings and that the attorney be 
present at and actively participate in all hearings.54  
 Thus, the lawyer should: 
1.  Obtain copies of all pleadings and relevant notices; 
2.  Participate in depositions, negotiations, discovery, 
pretrial conferences, and hearings; 
3.  Inform other parties and their representatives that he 
or she is representing the child and expects reasonable 
 
 48. Id. at Standard A-1 cmt. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at Standard A-3. 
 51. Id. at Standard C-1 
 52. Id. at Standard C-1 cmt. 
 53. Id. at Standard C-2. 
 54. Id. at Standard C-2, Standard B-1 cmt. 
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notification prior to case conferences, changes of 
placement, and other changes of circumstances affecting 
the child and the child’s family; 
4.  Attempt to reduce case delays and ensure that the 
court recognizes the need to speedily promote 
permanency for the child; 
5.  Counsel the child concerning the subject matter of the 
litigation, the child’s rights, the court system, the 
proceedings, the lawyer’s role, and what to expect in the 
legal process; 
6.  Develop a theory and strategy of the case to implement 
at hearings, including factual and legal issues; and 
7.  Identify appropriate family and professional resources 
for the child.55 
The Standards are also explicit about the duties of the lawyer 
with regard to hearings: “The child’s attorney should attend all 
hearings and participate in all telephone or other conferences with 
the court.”56  In addition,  
the child’s attorney should make appropriate motions, 
including motions in limine and evidentiary objections, to 
advance the child’s position at trial or during other 
hearings.  If necessary, the child’s attorney should file 
briefs in support of evidentiary issues.  Further, during all 
hearings, the child’s attorney should preserve legal issues 
for appeal, as appropriate.57 
Finally, “the child’s attorney should present and cross examine 
witnesses, offer exhibits, and provide independent evidence as 
necessary.”58 
The Standards also counsel that the child “should be present at 
significant court hearings, regardless of whether the child will 
testify.”59  The Commentary explains that the child has a right to 
“meaningful participation in the case . . . and the child’s presence 
underscores for the judge that the child is a real party in interest in 
the case.”60 
In addition, the Standards explain that even when “[t]he 
 
 55. Id. at Standard B-1. 
 56. Id. at Standard D-1. 
 57. Id. at Standard D-3. 
 58. Id. at Standard D-4. 
 59. Id. at Standard D-5. 
 60. Id. at Standard D-5 cmt. 
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child’s position . . . overlaps with the positions of one or both 
parents, third-party caretakers, or a child protection agency, . . . the 
child’s attorney should be prepared to participate fully in every 
hearing and not merely defer to the other parties.  Any identity of 
position should be based on the merits of the position . . . and not 
a mere endorsement of another party’s position.”61 
After the hearing, the lawyer “should review all written orders 
to ensure that they conform with the court’s verbal orders and 
statutorily required findings and notices.”62  Furthermore, the 
lawyer should discuss the order and its consequences with the 
child.63 
Thus, the Standards are an indispensable tool for lawyers in 
providing effective assistance of counsel to children in juvenile 
protection proceedings.64 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because what happens in court shapes the child’s future, 
access to effective assistance of counsel matters most.65  On a daily 
basis, judges make difficult decisions that affect the lives of children 
of all ages, races and cultures; it is, therefore, reasonable to assume 
that hearing from the lawyers who speak on behalf of these 
children is helpful in making those decisions.  Thus, providing 
children with “high quality representation,” as provided by the ABA 
Standards, is imperative.  Without such representation, the child’s 
access to justice is an empty promise. 
 
 
 61. Id. at Standard D-4 cmt. 
 62. Id. at Standard E-1. 
 63. Id. at Standard E-2. 
 64. The ABA STANDARDS also describe the role of the judiciary in enhancing 
the legal representation for children including assuring independence of the 
child’s attorney, assisting in the training of lawyers, assuring adequate 
compensation of children’s lawyers and authorizing lawyer access to files.  Id. at 
Part II—Enhancing the Judicial Role in Child Representation. 
 65. See Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical 
Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996). 
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